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Abstract
For diseases that infect humans or livestock, transmission dynamics are at least partially
dependent on human activity and therefore human behaviour. However, the impact of
human behaviour on disease transmission is relatively understudied, especially in the con-
text of heterogeneous contact structures such as described by a social network. Here, we
use a strategic game, coupled with a simple disease model, to investigate how strategic
agent choices impact the spread of disease over a contact network. Using beliefs that are
based on disease status and that build up over time, agents choose actions that stochasti-
cally determine disease spread on the network. An agent’s disease status is therefore a
function of both his own and his neighbours actions. The effect of disease on agents is mod-
elled by a heterogeneous payoff structure. We find that the combination of network shape
and distribution of payoffs has a non-trivial impact on disease prevalence, even if the mean
payoff remains the same. An important scenario occurs when a small percentage (called
noncooperators) have little incentive to avoid disease. For diseases that are easily acquired
when taking a risk, then even when good behavior can lead to disease eradication, a small
increase in the percentage of noncooperators (less than 5%) can yield a large (up to 25%)
increase in prevalence.
Introduction
The actions of agents in a disease outbreak are important to the spread and control of that dis-
ease. These actions can be viewed as being governed by “games”, i.e. mathematically defined
contests amongst individuals, with the aim of understanding how these actions viewed in the
context of the population response might influence the spread of that disease. While games
played in well-mixed populations are a subject of intense interest [1], considerably less atten-
tion has been paid to epidemiological games played in populations with structured contacts.
Strategic games have been of use in studying human disease [2], particularly in modelling
vaccination [3] and social distancing during an epidemic [4].
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Here, we use a game-theoretic approach to investigate the impact of farmer choice on live-
stock disease spread in an agricultural setting. Strategic games played between farms present an
excellent opportunity for studying games on an explicit contact structure, as interactions typi-
cally occur via discretely defined livestock movement patterns [5] or over a limited range of
physically possible fenceline contact structures, as farms are embedded in a landscape.
Game theory investigates the mathematical dynamics and equilibria of games played by at
least two players [6, 7]. In a classical game, players choose actions, and receive payoffs deter-
mined by the actions of all players. Game theory is usually used to find the equilibria or show
the optimal strategies of a game. Here, using a simulation approach we instead use the concepts
to focus on disease outcome, given a method of farmer strategy computation. This simulation
approach should find Nash equilibria of the game, but this is mainly of interest in how it con-
tributes to disease prevalence.
Computing the optimal strategies and equilibria of games is often intractable, and is made
even more difficult by including many players. Graphical games are a class of games in which
the payoff for a player is determined by the actions of only a small subset of the players, called
that player’s neighbours. These relationships can be denoted by a graph, or a network, consist-
ing of nodes joined by edges. We define a game played by farms on a graph drawn such that
nodes are farms, and two farms are joined by an edge if they share a fence line, and could there-
fore share disease. For comparison, we also consider a graph in which all farms are joined
by edges.
Farmers make many choices that impact their risk for livestock disease. They do not make
these choices in isolation, but instead in the context of policy, markets, and the behaviour of
their neighbouring farms. These choices can have a significant impact on the spread and preva-
lence of disease. In this work, we combine a game played on an explicit contact structure with a
disease model.
Examples of models incorporating the impact of social structure on disease prevalence are
few. Rich et al. [8, 9] implement a game theoretic model of farmer behaviour related to foot
and mouth disease (FMD) in South America. Farms are arranged in a grid on a torus, with
each farmer allowed a choice between a high risk and low risk action in a setting of perfect in-
formation. The payoff for a farm is calculated as the mean of the payoffs derived from the
game played with each neighbour. Payoffs are structured as for a stag hunt game, which has
been used in the past to model social cooperations and altruism [10]. Two adjacent farms re-
ceive the highest payoff if they both take the low-risk action, and a lesser payoff if they both
take the high-risk action. However, if one farmer takes the low-risk action and his neighbour
takes the high-risk action, he gets an even lower payoff. This is meant to reflect the higher cost
of the low-risk action and the danger of FMD spread from a neighbour.
They find that if there are initial high-risk farms, than all farms will eventually converge to
high-risk behaviour, and conclude that it is important to incentivise low-risk behaviours in
less-developed areas and industries, as high-risk behaviour areas can serve to spread bad be-
haviour and, implicitly, disease, to other areas. However, their model does not consider an ex-
plicit model of disease spread, which may result in different patterns of behavior, especially if
knowledge of the mechanism of disease spread is imperfect, and does not consider the impact
of flexible and stochastic payoff structures, two factors we implement here.
Thus our work advances on previous research in several ways in order to simulate a more
realistic game: the behaviour of agents is determined by their potentially incorrect beliefs de-
rived from previous turns of the game, the payoffs in the game are determined by the disease
state—not directly by the behaviour of other agents, and we consider differing distributions of
farmer disease preferences. This combination of evolved and differing preferences and
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imperfect knowledge is more likely to reflect actual farmer behaviour than previous work on
rational agents with perfect information.
Methods
We implement a simulation of farms in a game theoretic context, with disease spread influ-
enced by farmer choices, and farmer choices influenced by disease spread.
Game
Here, a game is a set of actions, payoffs, and states for some number of players. We consider
the disease-risk choices of farmers as actions in a game.
Each of the players in our game is a farm. On every turn each farm is either susceptible or
infected. On each turn, a farm chooses to take one of two actions. One action is safer, and one
is riskier with respect to the disease. The safer action could involve taking tighter biosecurity
measures for example, or buying in certified disease-free animals. Each farm has a payoff for
each pair of disease state and action. A payoff might include any of a variety of types of value to
a farmer, including financial profit, social value from behaving as peers might prefer, or fulfill-
ment of stewardship responsibilities towards animals.
On each turn, each farm simultaneously makes a choice of action. We simulate the spread
of disease given those actions, and then assign payoffs to each farm based on the actions and
disease statuses. We assume that the time scales of disease spread and farmer choice are similar;
this is consistent, for example, with farmer choices being responsive on the timescale of ob-
served changes in disease status. This choice also shows the effect of farmer behaviour on
disease prevalence.
One way in which our game differs from many other games, and in particular the game im-
plemented by Rich et al., is in its stochasticity. We do not deal in expected payoffs directly, but
at each turn assign a payoff to a farm depending on its stochastically determined disease status.
This noisy signal of infection impacts the development of farmer behaviour. This stochasticity
also causes the farmers to have imperfect information: one of our farmers will not know the
true expected payoff of an action given a state, only the payoff it receives given that state. Im-
perfect information and the potential to take a riskier action and not become infected may
cause a farmer that will, on average, get a higher payoff from a disease-free status, to develop a
preference for riskier actions. This results in substantially different aggregate farmer behaviour
than we would see in a deterministic or perfect information system.
Disease Model
We implement a simple SIS disease model in which every farm is either susceptible to the dis-
ease, or infected and infectious.
A farm transitions from susceptible to infected when it is infected by either an infected
neighbour or by an outside source associated with the action taken by the farmer (for example,
buying-in an infected animal). On a single turn, a farm that has brought-in an infection can
then infect a neighbour, but that neighbour cannot then infect a further neighbour that turn.
The probabilities of these infectious events are determined by the individual farm and the
actions taken by that farm.
A farm can recover from the infection, becoming susceptible with a probability that is a
function of the farm and action taken. Let f be a farm, and G = (V, E) the network of farms,
with f 2 V. We call the farms that are linked to f its neighbours and the set of those farms its
neighbourhood. LetA be the set of all possible actions,D ¼ fsusceptible; infectedg the set of
possible disease states.
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Our simulation allows farms to have differing probabilities of acquiring the disease in vari-
ous ways, as well as varying payoffs for the actions and disease states.
At the beginning of each simulation, we assign several parameters to each farm f 2 V:
• for each action a 2 A and disease state d 2 D: a payoff Y(f, a, d) that f would receive if it took
action a on a turn and ended that turn in disease state d,
• for each action a 2 A: a probability P(f, a) that f acquires infection from an external source on
a turn if it takes action a, and
• for each action a 2 A: a probability Q(f, a) that f recovers from the disease and becomes sus-
ceptible on a turn if it takes action a.
In addition, we assign to each edge (fi, fj) 2 E:
• a probability R(fi, fj) that, if one of fi or fj is infected on a turn, it will infect the other that turn.
We wish to capture the possibility of a continuum of risks, with the majority of them close
to the mean, and a few at each extreme—we therefore use truncated Gaussian distributions.
Unless stated otherwise, for all farms f 2 V, safe action a0, risky action a1, and edge (fi, fj) 2 E,
we draw the disease spread parameters for each farm from truncated Gaussian between 0 and 1
as in Table 1. In the simulations, we restrict assigned parameter values so that the safe action is
always better than the risky action (i.e. for all f, only P(f, a0)< P(f, a1) is allowed).
We are interested in regimes of endemic disease where neighbourhood infection can influ-
ence a farmers choice between a safe and a risky action. We have therefore chosen to investi-
gate payoffs such that at least some farmer choice will be influenced by neighbours, and avoid
payoff structures sufficiently extreme that farmers have a dominating choice regardless of the
infections and actions of their neighbours. Similarly, because we are not interested in disease-
free or total-disease regimes, we choose parameters to model a moderate prevalence endemic
disease, that is, a stable prevalence of greater than 0% and less than 100% percent.
On each turn of the simulation:
• Each farm makes an action choice (the method for this is described in the next Subsection:
Farmer Choice).
• We simulate farm recovery: for each infected farm f that chose action ai we use Q(f, ai) to de-
termine if f becomes susceptible.
• We simulate infection from an outside source: for each susceptible farm f that chose action ai
we use P(f, ai) to determine if f is infected from an external source
Table 1. Default values of μ and σ used for Gaussian distributions of simulation probabilities
throughout this work.
Quantity μ value(s) σ
P(f, a0) 0.1 0.1
P(f, a1) 0.1 0.95
Q(f, a0) 0.2 0.7
Q(f, a1) 0.1 0.05
R(fi, fj) 0.05 0.35
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0118127.t001
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• We simulate neighbourhood disease spread: for each edge (fi, fj) for which fi is infected but fj
is not, we use R(fi, fj) to determine if fi transmits the disease to fj
• We give each farm f that chose action a and is currently in disease state d a payoff of Y(f, a, d).
The payoffs given during the simulation are a function of the farm, action, and disease state.
The actions of neighbours only effect a farm’s payoffs in that they might have contributed to
the farm’s disease status.
Farmer choice
Real farmers operate in an environment of uncertainty and constraints. Farmers may form
opinions about disease risk based on their personal experience. Farmers can be differently ef-
fected by disease. For example, consider bovine viral diarrhoea (BVD), a disease that causes
substantial economic loss in Great Britain [12, 13]. The majority of that economic loss is from
abortions or other reproductive failures, and therefore BVD is likely to be far more financially
damaging to a dairy herd than a beef finishing herd [14]. We have tried to capture some of that
uncertainty, imperfect information, and difference in disease effect in our simulated farmers.
Farmer choice is complicated by a number of factors. Our farmers have imperfect informa-
tion, and their payoffs are only indirectly impacted by their neighbours’ choices, to the extent
that these impact their disease status. Initially, they are assumed to be naive, i.e. making choices
with little initial information. They gain information in the form of assigned payoffs through-
out the simulation.
We implemented two differing ways in which farmers might transform those payoffs into
opinions: idealist farmers and realist farmers. Like farmers comparing their situation to gov-
ernment or breed society expectations, our idealist farmers compare their current payoffs to an
idealised expected payoff that has been precomputed. In contrast, realist farmers compare the
outcome of their current action to the outcomes of their past actions to form an opinion.
Furthermore, we have chosen to have our farmers’ choices only effect their risk for infection
from buying-in animals; they are powerless to change their risk for infection from an infected
neighbour. This reflects the perceived situation for several major bovine endemics in Great
Britain, including bovine tuberculosis [11, 15].
Our approach to farmer choice. Every farm maintains three lists of information about its
payoffs and preferences. First, each farm starts with an estimate of the expected payoff given its
previous disease state, its action choice, and its previous neighbourhood disease state. It does
not take into account the possibility of neighbours bringing-in infection and then infecting the
farm this turn. For idealist farmers, this expected payoff is the point of comparison to their ac-
tual payoff at every stage in the simulation. For realist farmers, this estimate is only used when
a farm has no experience of its current situation, and so is generally only used at the beginning
of the simulation. Details of these estimates can be found in the attached S1 Appendix: Analyti-
cal details of payoff estimates and phase transition points.
Every farm maintains its own estimate of an expected payoff for a given disease state, action
choice and neighbourhood state. However, these payoffs are not directly used to choose ac-
tions. Instead, we use regret-based ratings derived from those payoffs. Importantly, these rat-
ings are not bounded above or below, which allows a run of good payoffs given an action and
state to build up positive feeling about that action. Then a negative outcome for that action
may take quite a long time to change the farmer’s belief in the desirability of that action.
We now describe how we calculate the estimated payoffs and action ratings.
Every farm has a record of estimated payoffs given a previous disease status, action choice,
and neighbourhood disease status. Idealist farmers do not adjust these over time, instead using
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the initial expected payoff estimate throughout the simulation. Realist farmers update their es-
timates by averaging the previous payoff record and the current payoff record for a state—
therefore these payoff records are discounted over time. A record for a disease and neighbour-
hood state is only updated when a farm encounters that state.
Let Paytðf ;F ; a; dÞ be realist farm f 2 V’s record of its decayed payoff record for taking ac-
tion a 2 A from disease state d with infected members its neighbourhood F prior to time t.
Consider farm f at the beginning of turn t: let d be its disease state and F be the set of its neigh-
bours that are infected at that time. If it chose to take action a on turn t, and then ended the
turn being given payoff p, then before turn t + 1, f updates:
Paytþ1ðf ;F ; a; dÞ ¼
Paytðf ;F ; a; dÞ þ p
2
ð1Þ
The simplicity of the discounting by dividing by two allows us to keep a single number for
an estimated payoff for each farm for each action and disease and neighbourhood state. We
have left the more memory-intensive computation and storage of a economic-style β exponent
discounting for future work.
If realist farm f did not start turn t in disease state d, did not take action a, or its infected
neighbours were not exactly the set F , then it does not change its payoff record for that disease
state, action, and infected neighbourhood, and
Paytþ1ðf ;F ; a; dÞ ¼ Paytðf ;F ; a; dÞ ð2Þ
Finally, every farm maintains a rating for each combination of action and neighbourhood
disease status that it encounters in the simulation. Let Ratetðf ;F ; a; dÞ be the rating farm f
holds for action a with disease state d and infected neighbour set F before turn t.
If on turn t farm f takes action a and starts the turn in disease state d with exactly F neigh-
bours infected, then:
Ratetþ1ðf ;F ; a; dÞ ¼
Ratetðf ;F ; a; dÞ
2
þ ðpk  p0kÞ
where pk is the payoff that f received on turn t, and
p0k ¼ maxai2A ðPaytðf ;F ; ai; dÞÞ ð3Þ
If f does not take action a, or did not start turn t with farm and disease status d, F , then
Ratetþ1ðf ;F ; a; dÞ ¼ Ratetðf ;F ; a; dÞ
This formulation allows a long run of positive results with a particular action in a set of dis-
ease circumstance to build up a high positive rating for that action in those disease circum-
stances. At the beginning of the simulation all ratings are set to zero.
When making an action choice, a farm checks all actions paired with the current neighbour-
hood and farm disease status. It then selects the one with the highest rating, breaking
ties randomly.
Farms only take into account the disease status of themselves and their neighbours. This
serves as an approximation of the sort of local disease prevalence knowledge that a real farmer
might have.
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Heterogeneity
Recall that before each simulation we assigned each farm a number of parameters that describe
how a farm might acquire, recover from, and pay for disease. We introduce varying levels of
heterogeneity into our model in the generation of the payoffs for farms.
We want to simulate two situations: a generally uniform farming industry in which most
farms are affected in a similar way by the disease but with some outliers, and an industry that is
composed of two different types of farm, one of which is much more affected by the disease
than the other. To achieve this, we generate the payoffs drawing from two different
distributions:
• a narrow unimodal distribution, here represented as a Gaussian distribution with σ of 0.01
• a bimodal distribution, here represented as the sum of two Gaussian distributions with
σ of 0.01.
We vary the values of μ across experiments and for different disease status and action pairs.
Unless we state otherwise, we use μ values as shown in Table 2.
We also run experiments in which a small percentage of farms have payoffs such that they
will always choose the riskier action. This is to simulate a real-life situation in which there is a
small group of farmers (“non-cooperators”) who are very resistant to the idea of avoiding the
disease. This can be for any of a number of reasons: they may be noncompliant with disease
prevention regulations for some reason, they may believe the disease does not effect them, or
even that it benefits them to have the disease present. The potential for noncooperators is a
concern of any disease control campaign, and so here we evaluate how big a noncooperating
group can be before it has a large effect on the overall prevalence of the disease.
Graphs
We use two different types of graph: a square grid to simulate the geographical layout of farms,
and for comparison a complete graph (a clique) in which every pair of farms are neighbours; i.
e. a homogeneously mixing farm population with no heterogeneous contact structure. We use
graphs of 1024 farms in our simulations, as this is sufficient to detect differences caused by dif-
fering parameters, but not so many as to be computationally intractable.
Table 2. Default values of μ used for unimodal and bimodal distributions of payoffs when simulating
disease spread and behaviour in a generally uniﬁed industry as well as an industry composed of
equal number of two types of holdings unequally effected by disease.
Action Disease State Distribution Type μ value(s)
Safer Susceptible Unimodal 0.8
Safer Infected Unimodal 0.35
Riskier Susceptible Unimodal 0.9
Riskier Infected Unimodal 0.45
Safer Susceptible Bimodal 0.7 and 0.9
Safer Infected Bimodal 0.7 and 0.0
Riskier Susceptible Bimodal 0.8 and 1.0
Riskier Infected Bimodal 0.8 and 0.1
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0118127.t002
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Results
We report disease prevalences and rates of change in disease status and action choice over sim-
ulations with different distributions of payoffs. Reported results are averages of 500
separate simulations.
Fig. 1 shows disease prevalence after 200 time steps of simulation (at which point qualitative
patterns of behavior had stabilized) on both the square grid and farm clique with varying prob-
abilities of neighbour infection, considering both unimodal (solid lines) and bimodal (dotted
lines) distributions of payoff.
Compared to the other scenarios, which ranked consistently across the infection pressures
of interest, simulations of idealist farmers on a grid with a unimodal distributions of payoffs be-
havior displayed a more marked changes in disease prevalence, with comparatively low preva-
lence for low neighbour infection probability, but a comparatively high prevalence as the
probability of infection increases. The bimodal distribution moderates prevalence on the
grid graph.
With more extensive heterogeneity in payoff distributions, some farms are less likely to be
swayed by their neighbours actions or disease status. Some farms gain so much by not having
Fig 1. Disease and risky action prevalence after 100 time steps of simulation on a grid graph and a clique graph with bimodal and unimodal
distributions of payoffs over a variety of neighbourhood infectiousnesses. In the left column we show results for idealist farms which compare their
payoffs to a set general payoff estimate, and on the right realist farms that compare to past payoffs they have experienced. In the top row we show the
percentage of farms that are taking the risky action, and in the bottom row the disease prevalence The simulations with unimodal payoff distributions are
shown with solid lines, and ones with bimodal distributions in dotted lines. The dotted and solid red lines on the right are identical. Results from simulations on
cliques are shown in blue, and results from simulations on grids in red. 95% confidence envelopes are plotted in pale shading around each line.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0118127.g001
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disease present that they will almost always take the safer action, even if their neighbours are
infected; similarly some farms are unaffected by disease presence, and will never take the safer
action. Thus the bimodal distribution moderates prevalence on the grid graph. This effect can
be seen in Fig. 2, where we see that increased heterogeneity causes decreased decision-chang-
ing. In a heterogeneous situation, farms are more consistent in their decisions, being less re-
sponsive to changing disease prevalence in their neighbourhoods. A difference in the
distribution of behaviour can drastically change the impact of disease management.
On the other hand, in the simulations run on a clique, the simulations using bimodal distri-
butions of payoffs always have higher prevalence than the simulations using unimodal distribu-
tions of payoffs. In the clique simulations with bimodal distribution of payoffs, approximately
half of the farms have payoffs such that they make the riskier choice for most of the simula-
tions. The clique structure then means that the remaining farms are more easily infected that
they would be in a grid.
We see higher prevalence and risk-taking in a realist rather than an idealist system (Fig. 1):
in a realist system farms with a strong negative experience with the safe action early on can be
dissuaded from ever taking it again, leading to high prevalence and risk-taking.
Fig 2. Percentages of farms changing disease and action state over the length of the simulation at differing probabilities of bringing-in the disease
with the riskier action, and two distributions of payoffs. In the left column we show results from simulations of idealist farms which compare their payoffs
to a set general payoff estimate, and on the right results from simulations of realist farms that compare only to payoffs they have experienced. 95%
confidence envelopes are plotted in pale shading around each line.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0118127.g002
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Consistency of Disease and Action
Fig. 2 shows the percentage of farms that change disease status (top) and action choice (bot-
tom) at each time step throughout the simulation for two different distributions of payoffs over
several probabilities of bringing-in the disease with the riskier action.
Overall, increased heterogeneity causes a decreased rate of disease status change and a de-
creased rate of action choice change. This is consistent with farms in a more heterogeneous sys-
tem being more likely to have extreme payoffs and preferences, and therefore being less likely
to be swayed by the disease status of their neighbours. In the homogeneous situation, farms are
more easily influenced by infections caught from their neighbours into taking the risky action
if the rate of catching the disease from neighbours is high enough, explaining the higher preva-
lence at higher local infection rates in the homogenous situation.
The exception occurs at high local disease transmission probabilities that result in very high
disease prevalence. In the case of very high disease prevalence, it is rare that a farm escapes or
recovers from infection. Therefore, few to no farms receive good payoffs for safer behaviour,
and all farms quickly switch to choosing the riskier action and continue to do so. Realist farm-
ers change disease state and action less, and have settled to a stable system of all farms infected
and taking the risky action before 200 time steps of simulation.
Small groups of noncooperative farms
Our previous figures have shown populations in which farms drew their payoffs from a sym-
metric bimodal distribution, composed of the sum of two Gaussians. In effect, this modelled a
population of two types of farms, with equal numbers of each type. Here, we present simula-
tions involving a small minority of farms (called noncooperative farms) that will always take
the riskier action, in order to show the impact on prevalence of a relatively small fraction of
noncooperators in a game. How many noncooperators can the game tolerate without a large
increase in disease prevalence, and how does that change with different disease
transmissibility?
For both realist and idealist settings, and for various proportions of non-cooperators, Fig. 3
shows the proportion of farmers taking the risky action (L) and the disease prevalence (R) as a
function of the probability of infection from the risky action (called the external risk). Both the
disease prevalence and number of farms taking the risky action increase monotonically with
the percentage of non-cooperative farmers in both idealist and realist situations. However, dis-
ease prevalence has a maximum value for intermediate external risk, with a discontinuity in the
behavior of the system. This discontinuity rapidly diminishes with increasing percentages of
non-cooperators, effectively disappearing when this reaches only 1 in 20 individuals. In con-
trast, the percentage of farms choosing the risky action decreases monotonically (Fig. 3),
though a similar discontinuity in response is observed.
The external risk at which this discontinuity occurs is determined by the difference in pay-
offs to the cooperative farmers between the safe and risky actions, i.e. the cost of the safer action
(details in S1 Appendix. Analytical details of payoff estimates and phase transition points).
There are effectively two disease regimes, one to either side of the discontinuity. Where ex-
ternal risk is low, the risky action does not have a sufficient penalty in expectation to dissuade
most farms. In contrast, where external risk is high, farms may avoid the risky action even if
one or two of their neighbours are infected, resulting in lower overall prevalence. Contrast this
with the system depicted in Fig. 1, in which higher local disease risk resulted in higher disease
prevalence and more risk-taking.
The crucial difference between the two regimes is in the main driver of disease prevalence:
at low external risk, disease prevalence is driven mainly by the external risk. At high external
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risk, disease prevalence is driven mainly by the spread of behaviour and disease from non-co-
operators. The non-cooperators are much more important in the high external risk regime.
Their influence on the behaviour of other farms can be seen on the left side of Fig. 3, where the
different proportions of noncooperators show a much larger impact on overall behaviour in
the high external risk regime than in the low external risk regime.
When the external risk is 30%, the difference in disease prevalence between 0% and 5% non-
cooperators in the idealist simulations is about 23%, with the dramatic (15%) increase when
comparing 0% and 1% noncooperators suggesting that the introduction of even a few nonco-
operators results in a phase transition in prevalence.
The difference between the idealist and realist simulations is striking: we see a much higher
overall disease prevalence and a much higher proportion of farms taking the risky action in the
realist setting. In the realist setting a small number of early experiences in which a farm be-
comes infected despite taking the more-expensive safe action can prevent that farm ever taking
the safe action again: the payoff estimate for the safe action becomes so low that the farm never
takes that action again, therefore never updating its estimate of the payoff for the safe action.
Because idealists compare the payoff they have received to an estimated payoff, there remains
hope that the safe action is a better option, even if the farm has had a poor payoff taking the
safe action in the past.
Fig 3. The disease prevalence (bottom) and percentage of farms taking the risky action (top) over a range of probabilities of bringing in the
disease with the risky action. Each line represents a different percentage of noncooperative farms. In the left column we show results from simulations of
idealist farms which compare their payoffs to a set general payoff estimate, and on the right results from simulations of realist farms that compare only to
payoffs they have experienced. 95% confidence envelopes are plotted in pale shading around each line bounded by dotted lines.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0118127.g003
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We investigated the importance of the initial payoff estimates on the overall results. As we
would expect, the impact of these changes is much larger in simulations of idealist farmers who
use the initial payoff estimates throughout the simulation as a point of comparison to their ac-
tual payoffs to generate their ratings for actions. In contrast, the realist farmers quickly discard
these initial estimates, and so carrying them has a much smaller impact. In either case, some
manipulations of the original payoff estimates have a large impact: if the estimates show the
risky action as at least as good as the safe action in the undiseased state, then many farms will
take the risky action in their first several actions, giving a very high initial prevalence. This very
high prevalence poses a sufficiently high subsequent infection pressure that the safe action is
no longer worthwhile for most farms, and the system is overcome with persistent high disease
prevalence. We leave a more fine-grained examination of the importance of initial payoff esti-
mates as future work.
We also considered the possibility of geographically clustered noncooperative farms. We
found similar results to unclustered noncooperative farmers with a decrease in prevalence with
more clustering. The decrease in prevalence is larger in a simulation with a larger number of
non-cooperative farms that in a simulation with a smaller number of noncooperative farms.
The prevalence decrease is due to the decrease in disease pressure from noncooperative farmers
with more clustering: for example, if a noncooperative farm is completely surrounded by other
noncooperative farms, that farm does not exert any infectious or behavioural pressure on any
other farms.
Discussion
In contrast to most analyses of human behaviour in epidemiological models, we concentrate
on the influence of behaviour trends on disease prevalence, rather than on behaviour equilibria.
This would be appropriate, for example, where legislation to control disease is responsive to
prevalence, and therefore long term behaviour is a less important measure.
We found that the distribution of payoffs can substantially impact disease prevalences.
However, the magnitude and even the direction of that effect depends on the transmissibility
of the disease and the arrangement of farmers. Even a small number of noncooperative farmers
can make a difference in prevalence, but this contribution is much larger and potentially more
important in a disease easily caught from a risky action.
Overall, the distribution of payoffs is important to disease spread. A bimodal distribution of
payoffs can result in a much different prevalence to a unimodal distribution of payoffs, even if
the mean payoff is the same across the two distributions. An examination of farmer attitudes to
disease and the different impact of disease on different farming business models is then an im-
portant part of a disease control program. We have used a simple model of farmer belief dis-
counting, leaving the more memory-intensive computation and storage of a economic-style β
exponent discounting for future work. Similarly, considering systems with different discount-
ing rates for different farmers is left for the future.
Our results provide many interesting insights into the relationships amongst stochastic ef-
fects, network relationships and the adoption of risky behaviour. First, where local transmis-
sion is clustered (in this case by spatial considerations, but also potentially via social
clustering), the variability resulting from local histories of infection can result in a drop in dis-
ease prevalence, provided there are sufficient individuals incentivised to take a protective action
(and even if some are considerably less inclined). This effect largely disappears where contacts
are more homogeneous, which effectively removes the effects of stochasticity (i.e. all individu-
als see much more similar infection risks).
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Second, while there are increased efforts to mobilise social behaviour towards the control
disease-related activity (e.g. via adoption of more stringent biosecurity measures, awareness of
trade related risks and adoption of voluntary vaccination campaigns), the uptake and therefore
impact on disease prevalence can be profoundly influenced by the existence of an external
threat, as is for example the case for bovine tuberculosis in Great Britain [15], or BVD in Scot-
land [16, 17], where in both cases some regions are largely disease-free, but subject to risks of
introduction via the importation of livestock from higher incidence areas. These external
threats can influence directly farmer behaviour or can themselves be altered via external factors
such as legislation.
Intervention efforts should include information for agents about the benefits of the preven-
tative behaviour. When agents only consider their past experiences (as in the case of our realist
farmers) and not a true estimate of the benefits of a safe action, disease prevalence increases.
This lends importance to efforts by governments and farming organisations to inform farmers
about the expected benefits of health schemes, and to provide appropriate incentives to encour-
age safe behaviour even in the face of poor personal experiences.
Risky behaviour spreads disease, which can, in turn, spread risky behaviour. An understand-
ing of both behaviour and disease parameters is essential to control disease.
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